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Fred Gray and the  
Role of Civil Rights Lawyers 
Jonathan L. Entin† 
In this concluding Article, let me pick up on some themes that Len 
Rubinowitz has explored1 and offer a few comments on the role of civil 
rights lawyers in general and on Fred Gray in particular. Mr. Gray’s 
epic career can shed important insight into our thinking about what 
civil rights lawyers do and how much their work matters. 
First, Professor Rubinowitz has focused on the work of Fred Gray, 
Arthur Shores, and Clifford Durr—lawyers based in Alabama who con-
stantly found themselves on the line by doing civil rights work in a 
dangerous time.2 He also discusses Robert Carter and Constance Baker 
Motley, who were based in New York but put themselves at risk when 
they traveled to the South in connection with their work.3 This aspect 
of the article illustrates that lawyers do not have a cloistered existence 
and can face harassment, ostracism, and worse simply for doing their 
job. 
In honoring the lawyers, we also should remember the courage of 
their clients. This reflects both the doctrinal rules relating to standing4 
and the reality that litigation is not an end but a means to achieve 
broader goals. So let us take a moment to think about the clients—
people like Barbara Johns, who at the age of sixteen organized a strike 
against segregated schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in the 
spring of 1951.5 That strike led to the filing of one of the lawsuits that 
was decided as part of Brown v. Board of Education.6 
And to connect this point to our Symposium, let me say a few 
words about Anthony Lee. I met him during the summer after my first 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
1. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray 
and His Colleagues, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1227 (2017). 
2.  Id. at 1232. 
3. Id.  
4. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
5. See Christopher Bonastia, Southern Stalemate 31–35 (2012); Richard 
Kluger, Simple Justice 468–71 (1976); Bob Smith, They Closed Their 
Schools 36–39 (1965); Jill Ogline Titus, Brown’s Battleground 5–6 
(2011). 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev’g inter alia Davis v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward 
Cty., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (three-judge court). For further discu-
ssion of Barbara Johns, see infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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year of college, when we were working on a civil rights project in 
California. We got to talking about our high school experiences, mine 
in Greater Boston and his in Tuskegee, Alabama. He casually mention-
ed that he had attended three high schools. Because Alabama’s public 
schools were segregated, he had started in the local black high school. 
Then, he said, there was a lawsuit, and he got to attend the white 
school briefly. But die-hard segregationists bombed that school so he 
wound up at yet a third high school. It was only years later that I 
learned that Anthony Lee was in fact the lead plaintiff in that lawsuit 
and that Fred Gray had been his lawyer.7 
Second, focusing on lawyers might imply that those lawyers do only 
one thing: litigate on behalf of clients. This raises several complex iss-
ues. For example, there is the question about whether the lawyer or the 
client controls the litigation (what Derrick Bell famously called the 
interest-convergence dilemma8 and what segregationists called barr-
atry—Fred Gray faced such baseless charges during the Montgomery 
bus boycott,9 and the Supreme Court later rebuffed similar claims in 
NAACP v. Button10). 
More important, the focus on the lawyer only as litigator buys into 
an oversimplified distinction between litigation and mobilization (or 
direct action) that lies at the root of some critiques of civil rights law-
yering. We see this distinction most clearly in Gerald Rosenberg’s influ-
ential work.11 Rosenberg argues that the judiciary is constrained by the 
conventions of legal reasoning, their lack of independence from the poli-
tical branches, and their limited resources.12 Courts, therefore, can serve 
as effective agencies of social reform only under extremely limited con-
ditions, such as when other actors are able to provide benefits for com-
pliance or impose costs for noncompliance, when market-oriented 
implementation is feasible, or when court decisions provide leverage or 
protection for officials and private persons or entities that are willing 
 
7. For the first installment in this long-running case, see Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (three-judge court). See gener-
ally Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice 203–13 (rev. ed. 2013). 
8. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980); see also Derrick A. 
Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976). 
9. See Gray, supra note 7, at 81–83; Rubinowitz, supra note 1, at 1262–64. 
10. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
11. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1991) (2d ed. 2008). The 
relevant portions of the two editions that are cited below have the same 
pagination, see Preface to the Second Edition at xi, so those citations do not 
distinguish between the two editions. 
12. Id. at 10–21. 
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to act.13 He further contends that none of those conditions existed in 
connection with civil rights litigation and that, if anything, Brown v. 
Board of Education was counterproductive by stimulating resistance in 
the white South.14 Instead, Rosenberg urges, racial progress arose from 
political developments and direct action that had nothing to do with 
Brown and other civil rights litigation.15 The Civil Rights Act of 196416 
and the Voting Rights Act of 196517 resulted from activism that was 
unrelated to Brown and other lawsuits: the sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and 
protest demonstrations in Birmingham and Selma that were inspired 
by the Montgomery bus boycott, which had its roots in earlier organi-
zing efforts.18 
Rosenberg’s analysis has generated intense debate. Some critics 
challenge some of his factual claims. For example, Michael Klarman, 
who agrees that Brown had limited direct impact on desegregation, ob-
serves that the massive resistance to the Supreme Court ruling in much 
of the South actually hastened the demise of segregation.19 He maintains 
that Brown drove southern politics so far to the right that the rest of 
the nation had no choice but to confront white defiance.20 This so-called 
backlash accelerated the social, economic, and cultural trends that 
would have led to the end of segregation, albeit several decades later.21 
Other scholars dispute Rosenberg’s contention that Brown did not in-
spire activists like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, and 
other less celebrated figures who took leading roles in major civil rights 
protests.22 And more recent scholarship suggests that preoccupation 
with the Supreme Court risks overlooking the diversity of approaches 
to addressing racism and discrimination, particularly local and grass-
roots strategies.23 
 
13. Id. at 30–36. 
14. Id. at 155–56. 
15. Id. at 42–49, 70–71. 
16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a 
to 2000h-6 (2012)). 
17. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. 
§§ 10301–10702 (2012)). 
18. Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 120–21, 134–50. 
19. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 441–42 (2004).  
20. Id. at 388, 392, 394–408, 441–42. 
21. Id. at 385–442. 
22. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing 
of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 Va. L. Rev. 151, 151–52, 154–57 (1994). 
23. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent (2011) (focusing 
on Atlanta in the second half of the 20th Century); Kenneth W. Mack, 
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We need not resolve the debate between Rosenberg and his critics 
to recognize that he addressed only one, albeit very important, question: 
whether courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular can 
effect “policy change with nationwide impact.”24 But many aspects of 
the judicial process suggest the inherent contingency of reliance on liti-
gation as a method of social reform. First is the challenge of finding 
suitable plaintiffs and making the necessary legal and factual showings 
to win a lawsuit. Then it is necessary to frame an appropriate remedy, 
which as we will see was particularly daunting in Brown. Yet even if 
defendants implement the remedy in good faith, officials in other jur-
isdictions might claim not to be bound by the ruling and refuse to follow 
it. That is what happened in Little Rock, where Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus tried to prevent the desegregation of Central High 
School,25 and in many other communities that chose not to desegregate 
until directly required to do so.26 Regardless of whether Rosenberg’s 
general claims about the lack of connection between Brown and later 
civil rights developments are correct, he properly focuses on the diffi-
culty of using litigation as a means for creating large-scale social change. 
Beyond the inherent limitations of the Supreme Court, however, 
there are other ways to think about using the judicial process to pro-
mote reform. Those who are dissatisfied with the status quo might find 
litigation useful as a means of political mobilization or as a catalyst for 
change in particular communities or sectors of society. For instance, 
advocates of higher pay for women used the prospect of litigation as an 
effective means of organizing workers and obtaining favorable contracts 
even without a sweeping Supreme Court ruling on comparable worth.27 
Let me illustrate this point with some examples from the civil rights 
context. Consider the work of Harry Moore, a longtime activist in Flor-
ida who was killed when his house was bombed on Christmas night in 
1951.28 A teacher and principal in segregated schools, he organized a 
local branch of the NAACP in 1934 and helped to create an association 
of black teachers.29 Moore played a leading role in litigation challenging 
 
Representing the Race (2012) (focusing on local activism during the 
period between World War I and World War II). 
24. Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
25. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
26. By 1964, a full decade after Brown, only 1.2% of African-American children 
in the South were attending school with whites; the figure was dramatically 
lower in the Deep South. Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 50, 52. 
27. See generally Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work (1994). 
28. Ben Green, Before His Time 1–11 (1999). 
29. Id. at 35–38. 
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racial disparities in teacher salaries. Those cases had mixed success.30 
Meanwhile, in response to Smith v. Allwright,31 which outlawed the Te-
xas Democratic Party’s white primary, Moore also organized the Pro-
gressive Voters League.32 That organization launched a statewide regis-
tration drive that tripled the number of black voters by the time of the 
1946 primary election.33 In the 1948 gubernatorial primary, the PVL-
endorsed candidate won a narrow victory.34 By 1950, the number of 
registered black voters was about six times the 1944 figure, and Moore’s 
group was largely responsible for the increase.35 
Harry Moore’s work illustrates the connection between litigation 
and activism. The teacher salary cases directly challenged racially dis-
criminatory pay scales. It took time to find willing plaintiffs, and the 
lawsuits had mixed success. But litigation was the only practical alter-
native in the years before Smith v. Allwright, when the all-white Demo-
cratic Party controlled Florida politics. But when the Supreme Court 
outlawed the white primary, Moore responded by organizing the Pro-
gressive Voters League. That organization had some impact on state 
and local politics, but it could not have attained its limited but occa-
sionally crucial political influence in the absence of the Smith ruling.  
We can see this relationship even more directly in connection with 
Barbara Johns and the events in Prince Edward County. When the 
African-American students at Robert Moton High School in Farmville, 
Virginia, went on strike, Barbara Johns contacted Oliver Hill and 
Spottswood Robinson, who were NAACP cooperating attorneys in 
Richmond, asking them to represent the students in obtaining better 
schools.36 Hill and Robinson initially dismissed the idea of taking a case 
 
30. Id. at 38–42; see also Jonathan L. Entin, Litigation, Political Mobilization, and 
Social Reform: Insights from Florida’s Pre-Brown Era, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 497, 
506 (2000). 
31. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
32. Entin, supra note 30, at 500. 
33. Green, supra note 28, at 54, 59; Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots 
133–34 (1976). 
34. Green, supra note 28, at 74–75; Entin, supra note 30, at 500–01 & nn.25–26. 
35. Green, supra note 28, at 117. 
36. The precise nature of the original contact is unclear. Some accounts say that 
the students, led by Barbara Johns, drafted a letter to Hill and Robinson on 
the first day of the strike. Kluger, supra note 5, at 470–71. Others say that 
Barbara Johns telephoned Hill. Bonastia, supra note 5, at 35. Student 
leaders who were interviewed some years later by journalist R.C. Smith say 
that a letter was written, but Smith also found telephone records documenting 
that someone called Hill and Robinson’s office from Moton High School on 
the first day of the strike. Smith, supra note 5, at 43. Resolution of this factual 
matter is irrelevant to the discussion here. 
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from Prince Edward County because they regarded the area as so hos-
tile that litigating there would be too dangerous for potential plain-
tiffs.37 But they agreed to consider the request if Barbara Johns and her 
fellow students could show that their parents and the African-American 
community supported the request and if they were willing to seek inte-
grated schools rather than improved segregated facilities.38 After exten-
sive discussion in two community meetings, broad support for a lawsuit 
directly challenging the constitutionality of segregated schools emerged, 
and Hill and Robinson took the case.39 
The story of Prince Edward County is quite complex. For our pur-
poses, it suffices to say that the events of 1951 show the interaction 
between litigation and direct action. The lawsuit challenging segregated 
schools arose as a direct result of the student strike, but that lawsuit 
would not have occurred without broad-based support among black 
parents and the African-American community. Still, the situation in 
Prince Edward County remains ambiguous. Local authorities closed the 
public schools in the face of a desegregation order; those schools re-
mained closed for five years until the Supreme Court ordered them re-
opened; virtually all of the white students in the county went to a new 
private, whites-only school that was staffed by white teachers and 
administrators who previously worked in the white public schools; the 
segregation academy litigated for years to keep its tax exemption and 
only grudgingly admitted students of color as part of that effort, then 
tried unsuccessfully to invalidate a whites-only restriction in a trust 
that was set up for the academy’s benefit.40 These are important and 
messy aspects of the story, but they should not obscure the larger point 
about the relationship between litigation and direct action. 
We can see yet another, and especially clear, illustration of the 
amorphous distinction between litigation and social mobilization in con-
nection with the Montgomery bus boycott. Some scholars have suggest-
 
37. Bonastia, supra note 5, at 35–36; Kluger, supra note 5, at 471, 475–76; 
Smith, supra note 5, at 44. 
38. Bonastia, supra note 5, at 36; Kluger, supra note 5, at 476; Smith, supra 
note 5, at 48; Titus, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
39. Bonastia, supra note 5, at 36–38; Kluger, supra note 5, at 476–78; Smith, 
supra note 5, at 48–60; Titus, supra note 5, at 7. 
40. For discussion of the closure of the public schools, see generally Bonastia, 
supra note 5, at 21–217; Smith, supra note 5, at 151–259; Titus, supra note 
5, at 11–159. On the Supreme Court ruling, see Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of 
Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). For discussion of the evolution of 
the public schools since their reopening in 1964, see Bonastia, supra note 
5, at 225–61; Titus, supra note 5, at 160–217. On the segregation academy, 
see Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, State Action, and the Legacy of 
Massive Resistance, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 769, 773–81 (1993). 
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ed that the desegregation of public transportation in the Alabama cap-
ital resulted from the litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gayle v. Browder,41 which invalidated Montgomery’s bus-
segregation ordinance.42 Other scholars emphasize the primary role of 
the protest itself and treat the legal aspects of the episode as secondary 
at best.43 In fact, however, litigation and activism played symbiotic, 
mutually reinforcing roles in Montgomery.44 What became the boycott 
was originally conceived as a one-day action to show support for Rosa 
Parks when she appeared in court after her arrest that soon morphed 
into a long-term challenge to segregation on the buses.45 Even then, the 
Montgomery Improvement Association’s original demands did not dir-
ectly include eliminating the color line on the buses, but only more 
courteous treatment of African-American passengers and more flexible 
administration of the areas where black and white passengers could 
sit.46 Only when the all-white city government proved to be completely 
intransigent did the movement demand an end to segregated seating.47 
To reinforce the attack on segregated seating, Fred Gray filed a 
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Alabama challenging the constitutionality of the Montgomery bus-
segregation ordinance.48 A divided three-judge court struck down the 
ordinance,49 and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed that decision 
 
41. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) 
(three-judge court). 
42. Catherine A. Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow 124 (1983); Robert 
Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955–1957, 9 L. & Hist. Rev. 59, 89–90 (1991). 
43. Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement 63 (1984); 
Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall 
and the Supreme Court, 1936–1961, at 305 (1994). 
44. Much of this discussion relies heavily on one of Professor Rubinowitz’s earlier 
works. See Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, 
Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery 
Bus Protest, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 663 (2005). 
45. Gray, supra note 7, at 54, 60–62; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, 
at 673–74. 
46. Gray, supra note 7, at 63–64; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, 
at 674, 681–82, 708 n.52. 
47. Gray, supra note 7, at 70–71; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, 
at 681. 
48. He deliberately did not include Rosa Parks as a plaintiff in the federal case 
because her criminal case was still pending in the state courts. Gray, supra 
note 7, at 70. 
49. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge court). 
This ruling came down on June 5, 1956, six months to the day after the bus 
boycott started. 
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nearly a year after the boycott began.50 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
ruling came in the midst of a state court proceeding that was intended 
to shut down the car pool that had been a vital part of the bus protest.51 
But that ruling did not by itself assure that segregation on the 
buses would end. This was November 1956, a time when Massive Resis-
tance was the norm in much of the South. Earlier that year, the Uni-
versity of Alabama had expelled its first black student, Autherine Lucy, 
after litigating all the way to the Supreme Court in an effort to remain 
a whites-only institution.52 And George Wallace was still a relatively 
obscure county judge rather than the die-hard resister who vowed to 
maintain “segregation now, . . . segregation tomorrow, . . . segregation 
forever” when he became governor in January 1963.53 
The Montgomery authorities might have tried to defy the Supreme 
Court, but they had to reckon with the bus boycott, which already had 
gone on for over a year and might have continued even longer if the 
white power structure held firm.54 At the same time, the boycotters 
were in peril from the local authorities’ efforts to enjoin the car pool 
that provided transportation to protest participants.55 But even more 
important, the boycotters themselves looked to the courts as an impor-
tant asset in their campaign. They persisted, ultimately for 382 days,56 
in large measure because they hoped for and expected vindication from 
the legal system.57 
In short, the Montgomery bus boycott in which Fred Gray played 
such a prominent role—as lawyer for Rosa Parks, as lawyer for Martin 
Luther King, as lawyer for the Montgomery Improvement Association, 
and as advisor to the protest leaders—illustrates the symbiotic relation-
ship between litigation and mobilization. 
 
50. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). 
51. Gray, supra note 7, at 91–93; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, 
at 684–85. 
52. Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955), aff’d per curiam, 228 F.2d 
619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956). See generally E. 
Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door 71–113 (1993). More than 
three decades later, the university overturned Ms. Lucy’s expulsion, and she 
received a graduate degree in 1992, a full forty years after she first applied. 
Id. at 260; Gray, supra note 7, at 55 n.4. 
53. See Gray, supra note 7, at 130–43 (recalling Mr. Gray’s interactions with 
Judge George Wallace during this period). 
54. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, at 687. 
55. See id. at 684−85. 
56. Gray, supra note 7, at 37 & n.3. 
57. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 44, at 700. 
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And Fred Gray himself illustrates that a lawyer can be more than 
a litigator. He played an important role in the proceedings that culmi-
nated in Judge Frank Johnson’s order that the Selma–Montgomery 
march take place with protection from law enforcement,58 and the 
march was pivotal to the adoption of the Voting Rights Act later that 
year. A few years later, Fred Gray was elected to the Alabama House 
of Representatives, one of the first two African-Americans elected to 
the state legislature since Reconstruction.59 
Fred Gray’s career shows us that a great lawyer—–and especially a 
great civil rights lawyer—does more than win cases. A great lawyer like 
Fred Gray lives with the aftermath of a case and helps to make sure 
that a win in court is more than a symbolic victory. We have a long 
way to go, but Fred Gray has understood and helped to define what a 
great civil rights lawyer does. 
 
58. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
59. Gray, supra note 7, at 264–65. That successful campaign took place in 1970. 
Id. In 1966, he lost a runoff in the primary. Id. at 255–60. 
